The Medieval problem of universals is a bit of a misnomer. The problem did not begin with medieval philosophers nor were they able to solve the problem. This should not discourage the inquiry as a continuous grappling with philosophical topics is normative. Perhaps they at one time looked upon their for-bearers such as Plato and Aristotle with the same kind of curious retrospection that the modern philosopher does with Boethius, Aquinas, and Duns Scotus.
Philosopher R.I. Aaron says this about universals “THERE have been periods when the problem of universals was the dominating theme of philosophical speculation. One such period was the medieval; another was that of Plato and Aristotle” (Aaron vii)
Is there really a problem of universals? Some philosophers have argued that the problem of universals is not really a problem at all. Other philosophers are more circumspect and view universals as a real problem that confronts philosophy. The problem of universals is similar to the problem of induction. There are arguments to be made for both positions. Prior to moving on to possible solutions to the problem it is interesting to note that there have always been skeptics who have questioned whether the business of universals is even worthy to be called philosophy; perhaps the whole affair is superfluous.
Philosopher Charles Landsmen offers a common sense approach to the problem he writes “It is a truism that there is such a thing as recurrence or repetition in nature.” (Landesman 8) He goes on to point out that in nature colors and shapes are repeated throughout. Consider the following statement an apple is red. This statement applies not only to an individual apple in particular but to many apples generally. Thus the problem of universals is simply the problem of recurrence. This seems to be axiomatic ergo no additional proof is needed to establish that a problem truly exists.
There are really only a finite number of possible responses to the problem of universals. On one hand you have the exaggerated realist. On the other hand, you have the nominalist. Throughout the centuries there have been various incantations of these views. From moderate nominalism to moderate realism the problem of universals has in no way had a universal response.
In order to properly discuss universals one must have a working knowledge of at least some of the terms that are used in relation to the various views. According to the Catholic Encyclopedia there are four main views. The first view addressed by the Catholic Encyclopedia is exaggerated realism. This is the view that there are universal concepts in the mind as well as universal phenomena in nature. In other words, the universal concepts in the mind are similar if not exactly the same as the things in nature.
In medieval thought there were two forms of realism. One was the aforementioned exaggerated realism and the other was a more moderate form of realism. In medieval philosophy realism represented a position taken on the problem of universals. According to the Columbia Encyclopedia
Extreme realism, represented by William of Champeaux, held that universals exist independently of both the human mind and particular things—a theory closely associated with that of Plato. Some other philosophers rejected this view for what can be termed moderate realism, which held that universals exist only in the mind of God, as patterns by which he creates particular things. St. Thomas Aquinas and John of Salisbury were proponents of moderate realism. (“Realism, in Philosophy”)
Nominalism on the other hand denies the existence of universal concepts and asserts that many particular things lumped together are simply a set. By way of analogy if I assert that Dan is a man and my neighbor Brian is a man this is not positing a universal. For the nominalist the term ‘man’ is a mere term or definition. Man is a particular and refers to a bundle of properties all of which are particulars.
Conceptualism is an intermediate position between nominalism and realism. For the conceptualist universals have no independent existence thus agreeing with nominalism. However, the conceptualist can agree that with the realist in acknowledging that universals exist albeit as a concept in the mind. This was the view that was propounded by Peter Abelard. The Columbia Encyclopedia notes that with some slight variations conceptualism becomes moderate realism.
Plato sought investigate the concept of universals in the Parmenides. The Platonic conception of universals was that particulars all participate in the universal. Take for an example a circle. Many common items are circular. All of these particular circular items participate in the ideal circle. This ideal circle is not something that we experience; however the phenomena of our experience participate in the universal ideal of a circle. Thus the Platonic theory of universals presupposes the Platonic theory of the forms.
Aristotle objected to at least one aspect of Plato’s reasoning. He did not believe that the statement “universals exist” was true apart from the existence of the particulars. For Aristotle universals existed however they only existed in so far as the particular existed. Theodore Scaltsas writes “that is called universal whose nature is to belong to a number of things” (Scaltsas 28). The universal was universal because it was a property of multiple particulars not because it participated in a form or ideal.
The problem of universals resurfaces in the middle ages. According to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Porphyry proposed a number of questions related to the problem of universals. These questions were undertaken by Boethius who interacted with the question by producing two commentaries on Porphyry’s writings.
The work by Porphyry was intended as an introduction. In fact, the name Isagoge is Latin for introduction. The work was specifically designed to introduce Aristotle to beginners. Philosopher John Marenbon says this “Porphyry believed that, even before they read the Categories using his simpler, question-and-answer commentary, beginners required an introduction to the terms and concepts used in these works.” (Marenbon 23) Porphyry has three questions that he posits in the Isagoge. He refuses to answer these questions as the book is after all intended for beginners. Nevertheless, the three famous questions which seemed to be the catalyst for two commentaries from Boethius are as follows: “(1) Do they exist or do they consist only in bare concepts? (2) If they exist, are they bodies or are they incorporeal? (3) If they are incorporeal, are they separated from sensible things, or do they exist in, and in connection with, them?” (Marenbon 24)
The first treatment that Boethius offers is regarding the question of whether genera and species exist or whether they consist only in bare concepts. To wit, Boethius replies that Porphyry would not have asked the second question if there were some doubt as to whether or not they exist.
The resolution to the first question for Boethius seems to be that because universals are part of everything that exists in some fashion they must exist therefore they cannot be mere thoughts. The second question is about whether or not they are corporeal or incorporeal. Boethius rejects an either/or and embraces both. Boethius says “There are species, differentiae, propria, and accidents that are corporeal (for example, human being, four-footed, ability-to-laugh, curly-hairedness) and those that are incorporeal (for example, God, rational, ability-to-add-up, knowledge); genera, because they may have corporeal and incorporeal species, are neither corporeal nor incorporeal, on this view. (Marenbon 26)
Boethius then formulates an argument to address the problem of universals with a number of premises. He winds up arguing that the problem is solved by abstraction. Genera and species exist in individuals or particulars but when thought about are universals. Fr. Copleston says it this way “they subsist in sensible things, but are understood without bodies.”(Copleston 138) Boethius was offering a solution that would find further expression later in St. Thomas Aquinas.
St. Thomas Aquinas formulated what might be called moderate realism. Aquinas was reacting to exaggerated realism. Consider the following quote:
“If you ask,” says St. Thomas, “whether that nature (humanity, or human nature considered in the absolute or abstract) can be characterized as one, or as many, I answer that it cannot be described as either one or many, because each of these attributes lies outside the concept of humanity, and either can happen to be verified of it. For if plurality were essential to it, it could never be singular, whereas it is singular as found, for example, in Socrates. And similarly if unity were essential to it as conceived by the intellect then it would be numerically one and the same nature in Socrates and Plato, for example, and could not be multiplied in a multiplicity of individuals.” 1″ (Coffey 270)
St. Thomas is reacting to the notion that universals have existence independent of particulars. In other words, for each instance of a universal such as red the particulars participate in the universal. Shades of red are all particular examples of the universal known as red. The previous quote from St. Thomas illustrates this point. If man is a universal, then to say that Socrates is a man and Plato is a man in the sense of numerical oneness is to say that Socrates and Plato are the same man.
On the other end of the spectrum is the nominalist who denies the existence of universals all together. The school of Roscelin asserted that universals were simply generalizations that come from experience. This form of empiricism would have us believe that universals are based on observation of sense data. Every example of the color red is an empirical experience that the mind inductively categorizes as red. Shades of red are based on facts that exist in the real world. Ergo, the universal “red” is not really a universal rather this refers to something that is experienced in the world of particulars.
Philosopher Gordon H. Clark says that Roscelin was “the first or at least chief of the early nominalists” (Clark 261). According to Dr. Clark Roscelin held that categories or species are simply words. He asserts that for Roscelin the words are “flatus voices, the breathing of the voice” (Clark 261). This view leads Anselm to declare that Roscelin view of the Trinity was heretical due to his sensory epistemology. (cf. Clark 261)
As an interesting side note, Peter Abelard was something of a turncoat nominalist. Abelard studied under both William of Champeaux an extreme realist and Roscelin the nominalist. Once again according to Dr. Clark Abelard’s concern for the Trinity drove him to formulate a compromise between nominalism on the one hand and realism on the other.
For the medieval philosopher the idea of universals was found in the study of the ancient Greeks. The various notions of universals as presented by Plato and Aristotle and perhaps antecedently by Thales; are evaluated by the aforementioned thinkers. There are certainly others who address the topic of universals and particulars however for the sake of brevity only a handful was covered. The challenge for the aspiring philosopher is best expressed by turning one final time to Dr. Gordon H. Clark. He recalls “an oracular professor of logic once told his class, as they opened to the first page of the textbook, that they could not understand the first chapter until after they had understood the last chapter” (Clark 89)
This seems to be true of the study of metaphysics. It seems to be very difficult to formulate a treatment of the particular i.e. nominalism, realism, or conceptualism without first understanding all of them. The implications for the theologian are multi-faceted. What one believes about realism affects his or her doctrine of the Trinity, the fall, the nature of man and so on ad infinitum. The difficulty for medieval philosophers was attempting to maintain orthodoxy while carefully considering the concept of universals and particulars. The options available several hundred years ago, by in large have been inculcated into the theologies of most modern scholars.
There is perhaps one exception and this is the thought of Dr. Cornelius Van Til. Dr. Van Til’s notion of universals is found distinctly within the Christian worldview. He begins by acknowledging the problem, he writes that “the whole problem of philosophy may be summed up in the question of the relation of unity to diversity” (Bahnsen 238)
As Dr. Bahnsen points out, universals must not be thought of as existing apart from God. Rather Dr. Bahnsen and Van Til advocate a different notion of universals. For Van Til, “universals exist in the concrete (not abstract) fashion within the mind of the personal Creator Himself” (Bahnsen 240).
Accordingly, if God thinks universally then man thinks analogically. This seems to be a completely different approach to the problem of universals as found in the other schools of philosophy. The particulars then are not abstract but are rather derived from the universal nature of God. This argues Van Til means that particulars are not only dependent on God they are also derived from his universal nature. In other words, there is a fundamental unity between the particulars and the universals.
This view of universals offers another solution to the problem. The problem of universals is one that has been around for quite literally thousands of years. However, as outlined above, philosophers in the past have grappled with the notion of universals and particulars. Today as in the past philosophers are still considering the problem.
In conclusion, the problem of universals will likely never be solved. Plausible solutions aside, philosophy in the middle ages as well as the modern age continues to excite the imagination of theologians and philosophers. The importance of understanding our philosophical for-bearers in the middle ages will inform our understanding of the problem and provide fodder for further philosophical inquiry.
References
Aaron, R. I. (1952). The Theory of Universals. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Retrieved April 18, 2010, from Questia database: http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=34031340
Bahnsen, Greg L. (Van Til’s Apologetic: Readings and Analysis Presbyterian and Reformed: New Jersey
Clark, Gordon H. (1957) Thales to Dewey: A History of Philosophy Houghton Mifflin Company: Cambridge
Coffey, P. (1917). Epistemology: Or the Theory of Knowledge: An Introduction to General Metaphysics (Vol. 1). New York: Longmans, Green. Retrieved April 18, 2010, from Questia database: http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=59632093
Realism, in Philosophy. (2009). In the Columbia Encyclopedia (6th Ed.). New York: Columbia University Press. Retrieved April 18, 2010, from Questia database: http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=117041694
Hartshorne, C. (1965). Anselm’s Discovery: A Re-Examination of the Ontological Proof for God’s Existence. La Salle, IL: Open Court. Retrieved April 18, 2010, from Questia database: http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=77587473
Jolivet, J. (1998). Chapter 2 From the Beginnings to Avicenna. In Medieval Philosophy, Marenbon, J. (Ed.) (pp. 29-48). London: Routledge. Retrieved April 18, 2010, from Questia database: http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=102934319
Landesman, C. (Ed.). (1971). The Problem of Universals. New York: Basic Books. Retrieved April 18, 2010, from Questia database: http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=101070605
Marenbon, J. (2003). Boethius. New York: Oxford University Press. Retrieved April 18, 2010, from Questia database: http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=105173548
Scaltsas, T. (1994). Substances and Universals in Aristotle’s Metaphysics. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Retrieved April 18, 2010, from Questia database: http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=103729245