Scientism: A review of Edward Feser’s indictment of Scientism

 

Blinded by Scientism and Recovering Sight after Scientism

A review of Edward Feser’s indictment of Scientism

 

In the 1980’s pop musical group Thomas Dolby had a hit song that included the rather catchy refrain “She blinded me with science”[1].  Nearly forty years later Philosopher Edward Feser has asserted with considerable vigor that the lights have gone out not just on hormonal techno-pop stars but on culture writ large.  In two articles his project is to convince us that scientism is either trivially true or self-defeating.[2]

The first thing that Feser does is to proffer a definition of scientism. Essentially, scientism is the “view that all real knowledge is scientific knowledge”[3] The definition is interesting as it uses the term ‘view’ as opposed to ‘belief’. While view and belief are synonyms the connotation of belief is altogether different than that of a view. The choice of words is important especially given Feser’s acknowledgement that much of culture has inculcated a rudimentary form of scientism that posits an insoluble dichotomy between ‘faith’ and ‘reason’.

Feser argues persuasively that scientism like positivism cannot substantiate its own claims based on the very principles that it asserts as a precondition. In order to do this, Feser argues from a presuppositional perspective. This presuppositional critique begs for explication as it may not be unambiguous at first blush. In order for Feser’s critique of scientism to demonstrate Q.E.D. that scientism is self-defeating he must show that scientism’s presuppositions do not project. A robust discussion of projection is most likely outside of the scope of this review but suffice to say that presuppositions that do not project ultimately reduce to absurdity.

The counterclaim that Feser is making is not necessarily deductive nor positive but rather inductive and negative. In other words, since science presupposes the uniformity of nature or in Feser’s words that the “world is governed by causal regularities”[4] any attempt to justify these presuppositions must commit the adherent of scientism to the fallacy of petitio principii.  Here is where Feser could have made an even stronger modal claim.  If scientism cannot rationally justify its own presuppositions, then science does not provide the preconditions of intelligibility necessary to make any epistemic claim whatsoever. Not only is scientism self-defeating it lacks the rational machinery to make epistemological claims of knowledge. Scientism fails to obtain because it has moved from its moorings into the deeper waters of metaphysics and in so doing must have a way to evaluate metaphysical claims. Feser points out that questions of universals and particulars finds no satisfactory response from scientism. [5]

The second horn of the dilemma and the counterargument from F.A. Hayek can be conjoined and remain succinct. The second horn of the dilemma seems more difficult for scientism.  If philosophy must be employed in order to justify the presuppositions of science then philosophy is the antecedent tool that must be utilized by science. However, as Feser acknowledges advocates of scientism may well concede this point by subsuming philosophy under the genus of science[6]. Simply put, there is no unambiguous and non-controversial way for science to maintain such a taxonomy.

The counterargument offered by Feser that finds its genesis in Hayek is that scientism is viciously reductionist. All immaterial aspects of human experience must be consigned to subjectivity. Feser’s rejoinder to such a reductionist program is to remind science that science is catalyzed by the very immaterial ‘events’ that it distills down into subjectivity. Any claim to objectivity is merely a poorly disguised subjectivity if scientism eliminates the incorporeal mind and identifies thought with the interactions of biochemical neurotransmitters.

 

 

Feser succeeds because scientism fails to acknowledge its debt to philosophy. Metaphysics has been disparaged by contemporary science as phantasms and the domain of religious speculation. However, Feser proffers a quote from E.A. Burtt that should serve as the only rejoinder needed to dispense with such an assertion. Burtt says this about metaphysics “even the attempt to escape metaphysics is no sooner put in the form of a proposition than it is seen to involve highly significant metaphysical postulates”[7]

In essence those who eschew metaphysics will incline themselves to elevate their own methodology into a pseudo form of metaphysics. In a real sense this is where speculative metaphysics begins and science ends. To that end, science in the absence of metaphysics must replace metaphysics with method, something that simply cannot be done.

The recovery of one’s vision entails a return to philosophy. The quote from John Kekes is apropos if we are to have our sight restored. The “paradigm of rationality”[8] is not to be found in science qua science but in philosophy generally and metaphysics particularly. We shall remain in the pall of smoke from the fire burning in Plato’s cave until such time as scientism is considered the type and shadow and not the bright sun of philosophy.

Feser’s article reminds the philosopher that philosophy is the rightful heir to evaluating the presuppositions of science. Lady Philosophy was handled roughly by the ancient sophists in much the same way she is being mistreated by the new school sophists of scientism.

 

References

Dolby, T. (1982). She Blinded me with Science [Recorded by T. Dolby]. London, England.

Feser, E. (2010, March 12). Blinded by Scientism. Retrieved from The Public Discourse : http://www.thepublicdiscourse.com

Feser, E. (2010, March 12). Recovering Sight after Scientism. Retrieved from The Public Discourse : http://www.thepublicdiscourse.com

[1] Dolby, T. (1982). She Blinded me with Science [Recorded by T. Dolby]. London, England.

[2] Feser, E. (2010, March 12). Blinded by Scientism. Retrieved from The Public Discourse : http://www.thepublicdiscourse.com

[3] Ibid, pg. 1

[4] Ibid, pg. 2

[5] Ibid, pg. 2

[6] Ibid, pg. 5

[7] Feser, E. (2010, March 12). Recovering Sight after Scientism. Retrieved from The Public Discourse : http://www.thepublicdiscourse.com pg. 4

[8] Ibid, pg. 3