The Existence of God

This is a different form of the ontological argument. It owes its existence in part to Immanuel Kant and in another part to the work of Calvinist philosophers. It is called “presuppositional” because it argues from the coherence of Christian presuppositions. The construction is not principally positive but rather works via negativa.  (Editorial note: I have included what I regard as the most erudite objections to the argument and have included my replies to various interlocutors)

A presupposition has to do with what a speaker presupposes to be true when making a claim. Thus, we presuppose many things in ordinary non-controversial speech that are never subjected to a rigorous philosophical and/or logical examination.

My own humble contribution to the argument was to apply the “projection” framework used in other philosophical disciplines in order to show the projection of Christian presuppositions with respect to the question of the existence of God.  Projection roughly has to do with what is embedded in the presupposition. Consider the following rough outline of the Presupposition contained in sentence (1) with the associated embedded content of (2-8)

1) God exists and is immutable, invariant, and universal

2) God is identifiable and salient

3) The universe contains laws that are immutable, invariant, and universal

3a. Laws of logic are immutable, invariant, and universal

3b. Laws of logic are identifiable and salient

4. God does not exist (negation)

5.It is possible that the universe came about by random chance (modal possibility)

6.If God does not exist then chance does not entail universal, immaterial, and invariant laws (conditional antecedent)

7.If laws of logic are universal, invariant, and universal then very likely God exists (probability adverb)

8.Laws of logic are universal, invariant, and universal therefore the Christian believes God exists (belief operator)

In classic logic, sentences 2-5 may not follow deductively however when considering sentence (1) the various operators denoted above are embedded in sentences (2), (3) (3a.)(3b.) There has been considerable thought given to the nature of presuppositions. For the purposes of Christian apologetics, it should be noted that negation or denial of our opponent’s presuppositions is tantamount to the Van Tillian method of apologetics.

In ordinary speech, the speaker generally assumes “common ground” with his or her hearers, this could be thought of as pragmatic presuppositions. Once the presupposition has been communicated it generally accepted that the hearer either implicitly accepts or explicitly denies the speakers’ presupposition. When a presupposition fails to project, or in other words when all of the embedded propositions do not follow the presupposition is said to be canceled.

Objection #1
At first glance it’s hard to know which part of this he considers the “presupposition.” I know which part, in fact, he considers to be the assumption by the nature of logical proofs; that is, he is assuming a negation by way of ID to prove that the preceding premises are valid. However, for a moment, I’d like to address the premises. In P1 I see three predicates assigned to God – immutability, invariability and universality.

Answer #1

Perhaps reverting back to the original form will prove helpful. God exists and is immutable, invariant, and universal. This is a sentence, but to put it in logical form let us dispense with the copula and consider this as conjunction of p & q.

p God exists
q God is immutable, invariant, and universal

Obviously, if we consider p & q on their own merits, we have formally committed ourselves to something that intuitively seems amiss. However, and this is important the argument is proceeding presuppositionally. Let’s us reconsider this in terms of the presuppositions of p & q. Let (ps) stand for a presupposition and p & q stand for what has been offered previously.

If one accepts the plugs, holes, and filter roles of presuppositions (as I do) then it will become apparent that this is not at all problematic for the presuppositional apologist. In this case logically this would look like this ps(p) & (p->ps(q)). The predicates in the conjunction (q) are satisfied in (p). By the way this bears upon what R.L ( interlocutor). follows up with, if-then sentences are filtered in the same way.

All of the sentences (1-8) are a part of the utterances of someone that presupposes the Christian worldview. This is not say that in terms of classic logic these presuppositions are going to follow deductively per se. This is not the intention of the argument that was proffered. The actual argument is that Christian presuppositions project, they have compositionality. In contradistinction, the atheist must subject his or her presuppositions to the same scrutiny. Do the presuppositions of atheism project? Can they provide a coherent composition on the whole from the presuppositions of the parts?

Objection #2

 Are you confusing the “laws of logic” aka “laws of thought” with the facts they may represent (e.g the fact of identity)?

Answer #2

This is perhaps the most interesting component of your objection. IT assumes the validity of the law of identity. The LI is given a place of primacy among both theists and atheists alike, and seems to be taken as a given. However, this so-called law is problematic on at least two counts.

1.The law of identity, is merely rhetorical. Asserting that x=x is a tautology, substitute any number of subjects for (x) and the nature of the case becomes clear. A cow is a cow, a car is a car, and so on ad infinitum.

2.The difficulty is that x is the subject and is linked by the word “is” in logic this called a copula. However when in this case, the instantiation does not refer to a property of the object (or a predicate) but attempts to instantiate the subject as a property of the subject.

So, to be clear there is no confusion with respect to confusing the law of identity with other laws of logic. Consider for a moment the law of contradiction. The law of contradiction says that p is not ~p. This entails the subject and the predicates that attach to p, and by way of negation as p and every predicate regarding p cannot be the same as ~p. Repeating p=p is just that repetition.

Objection #3

What do you mean when you say “The universe contains laws…”? Where are these laws contained? How are they contained?

Answer # 3

Laws of logic are abstract entities. Asking where or how they are contained would be akin to asking where ghosts reside. They are not “contained” anywhere, this highlights a key problem when considering laws of logic in the atheistic scheme. According to atheism laws of logic by necessity must be contained in minds, which I take to have material equivalence with a person’s brain. Thus, laws of logic are reduced to chemical interactions and certain brain states and posits the mind-brain identity theory. However, for you and I to use laws of logic in rational discourse we must have the same brain state, meaning of course that laws of logic ultimately cannot be trusted.

Objection #4

You say “It is possible that the universe came about by random chance”. How do you know this is possible? Do you believe randomness is possible?

Answer #4

Re-read the post on Presuppositions and Projection, (5) is modal possibility based on (4) and the conditional antecedent (6) the implicatures of (1-3a,b,c) bear upon (4,5,6) and determine whether Christian presuppositions project. I am not nor would I argue for randomness outside of its modal possibility, one that is negated because it entails the non-existence of God.

Objection #5

If we take the cosmological argument, the necessity of a creator cannot be induced, for it employs observation by the assistance of the principle of sufficient reason to infer that God is necessary.

Answer #5

This is a lovely objection and one that sounds quite convincing. However, the eventual luster is a mere facade as this misses the mark. As a thought experiment let us pretend that all contingent beings are inside a large circle. Let’s label this set (a) and allow (a) to stand for all contingent beings in the world. What might we suppose is the sufficient reason for any particular contingent being (b) well simply put, some other contingent being (c). We can provide the sufficient reason for (b) which is of course (c). However what is the sufficient reason for (a)? The set of all contingent beings simply cannot be contingent on (b,c) but according to this objection [found also in J.L. Mackie’s work,The Miracle of Theism] there must be sufficient reason for the set of all contingent beings. What options do we have? Do posit a contingent being outside of the circle? This cannot be so, since any contingent being must by necessity be a part of set (a). Philosophers including Richard Taylor have stated that it is odd and arbitrary to consign sufficient reason to every other contingent being while deny this status to the *world*.

Objection # 6

 Whether you believe reality to be an assumption, or dependent on the mind, or independent of the mind, the fact remains that, if you assert that X cannot exist without Y, the necessity of Y must be logically argued. 

Answer #6

This is a non-sequitur. The presuppositional apologist does not argue that laws of logic cannot exist without God. The presuppositional apologist (PA) argues that based on God’s self-disclosed revelation, the laws of logic are coherent as immaterial, invariant, abstract entities. The necessary implication of God’s self-disclosure has the PA conjoining his/her epistemological pre-commitments with his/her metaphysical pre-commitments rescuing him/her from utter skepticism.

Objection # 7

Show us how X works without God. But this implies the necessity of God; it doesn’t actually demonstrate that without God, for instance, laws of logic are impossible.

Answer #7

There is considerable confusion belied in this objection. The PA is arguing that the laws of logic are internally consistent when the Christian worldview is taken as whole, or a system of thought. Our epistemology presupposes and is entailed by our metaphysics. The PA is not asking for a demonstration of the impossibility of the laws of logic without God, rather the PA is asking for an accounting of the internal consistency of abstract entities in the atheistic worldview. The nuanced difference is remarkable. The question is one of final authorities and the PA is asking for the anti-theist to provide *at* the presuppositional level the final authority by which metaphysical and epistemological skepticism can be avoided. The Christian God is the final authority for the PA, and since the question is one of competing epistemology, the question is both fair and reasonable.

Objection #8

We presuppose God – check. Then, we presuppose that logic is universal and dependent on God – check. Then we presuppose that without God, nothing is intelligible – check. It’s a chain of presuppositions ad infinitum. 

Answer #8

This a common, albeit misguided objection. We cannot simply presuppose anything we want, since our presuppositions must allow for consistent application of everything we subsume under the heading of knowledge. The argument that logic is dependent upon God may in some sense be true, the way that the objection is formulated misses an important distinction.  Rather, the argument is an indirect proof, offering an assumption to derive a contradiction which leads to the conclusion that the original assumption is false. The presupposition of the non-existence of God according to the PA leads to a contradiction that indirectly proves that the aforementioned assumption is false.  In the last sentence, you seem to equivocate between presuppositional apologetics and foundationalism. This is a recent refrain from atheists interacting with PA methodology but the objection does not attain since it is arguing against something foreign to PA.