A philosophical case against common grace.

 

 

Philosophical issues with Common Grace. Hereafter CG.

Part One

Specific [non-biblical] criticisms of CG

1. i) CG is unnecessary. The hidden premise of proponents of CG seems to be that God’s plan allows for some contingency. In other words without CG, the *amount* of evil in the world could somehow rise to proportions that would thwart God’s teleos. For example if person (x) wants to commit evil (y) what is stopping them? Adherents of CG would argue that if evil (y) does not occur then God’s CG has restrained evil (y). I would argue that CG [if you can even call it [ 1) Common and 2)Grace ] rather is part of God’s purpose in the world. If God has decreed that evil (y) will not come to pass, then by virtue of his will evil (y) cannot come to pass.

Let’s try this another way:

Suppose that (a) represents all acts of both “evil” and “good” in the world. In this thought experiment let (b) stand for the elect, and (c) represents God’s purpose.

If scripture is true (which I affirm) then the adherent of CG must say that either 1) evil is limited to a number of predetermined acts of evil which by definition are limited in number, scope, and are part of God’s plan or 2) Evil acts exist outside of the predetermined plan and God must respond actively to man both individually and specifically [more on this in a moment]. I would argue that the more logical position would be to deny CG and acknowledge that (a, b, c) are bound together in God’s redemptive purpose for his elect. The number of evil and good acts is predetermined by God, designed to bring his elect to salvation, and to further their sanctification.

In other words, if [a] is not tied in some way to [b] and [c] then [a] exists only in temporality. The logical conclusion of this premise is that for all that is entailed by [a] God must adjust [b,c] by observing the outcome of [a] as these events unfold in time. Open theism follows by good and necessary consequence. Remember CG as construed by adherents is that it has both 1) positive and 2) negative attributes. The positive pole is the sun shining on the just and the unjust as well as the negative pole i.e. restraining maximal evil.  Apparently, CG did not function in the OT as it seems that the evil in Noah’s day was maximized to the point that God destroyed all but Noah’s family. Was it God’s will that he would punish the inhabitants of earth in that day by exacting the end of their days or had CG failed to restrain evil to the point that God was responding in time to evil acts [not realizing that they would act as evil as they did?]

ii) Implications of 2) Evil acts exist outside of the predetermined plan; God must select from any number of propositions. For every occurrence of evil in the world; CG would posit that God has restrained the amount of evil that occurred. Philosophically this posits an indeterminism within the Godhead that responds to temporal events. Future causation is based on indeterminate and changing sets of propositions. Furthermore, the results of such a construct ultimately impugn God’s character by positing the Holy Spirit as the proximate cause of evil.

For example, let’s suppose that a man has a certain number of evil acts in mind (a) (b) (c) or (d). Each act of evil escalates objectively in evil. Let’s suppose that for each act of evil there are four possible outcomes. So that is (a x 4) (b x 4) etc., in this example there are 256 possible outcomes. CG would have us believe that the Holy Spirit selects (passively) by way of restraining (actively) all but one possible outcome. In this framework, God becomes the proximate cause of the evil act rather than the ultimate cause [the difference is remarkable] this also posits a future that is partially unknowable even to God.

iii) Posits a dualism within God’s grace. The concept of CG posits two sorts of grace. One special [electing] and the other common [non-electing]. Here CG generally and Kuyper specifically has as its project a redefining of total depravity. The sinner who is dead in trespasses and sins (Ephesians 2:1) is dead but not disintegrating. He is dead but Kuyper insists that he (the unregenerate) could get worse. While God’s special electing grace is not conveyed upon the spiritually deceased, he is able to respond to God’s common grace.

In Robert Reymond’s A New Systematic Theology of the Christian Faith he affirms Total Depravity but offers this clarification:

From these and many other passages which could be cited, it is clear that the Bible affirms of fallen mankind total (that is, pervasive) depravity. By this I do not mean that people act as bad as they really are by nature, since they are prevented from doing so by several manifestations of God’s common restraining grace… (Reymond, p. 452)

According to Reymond people are worse than they act. I can agree, however the part that seems troublesome is that now Reymond has God’s common grace manifesting itself in several different ways. He goes on to argue that civil government is part of God’s common grace. Isn’t this a non-sequitur? If civil government is an extension of grace how does one justify the existence of totalitarian dictatorships? What about Communist governments that are atheistic? The argument that Romans 13 is an extension of common grace breaks down. The passages are written to believers, not unbelievers. CG attempts to universalize an imperative to obey civil government, furthermore what about the criminal who did not *obey* civil government? Did God’s manifestation of common grace in this case fail to achieve its purpose? This leads to an infinite regress.

 

Part Two

2.Common Grace or common providence?

In denying common grace, one must wrestle with the Matthew 5:44-45

44 But I tell you, love your enemies and pray for those who persecute you, 45 that you may be children of your Father in heaven. He causes his sun to rise on the evil and the good, and sends rain on the righteous and the unrighteous.

This is an area where my thinking has been admittedly too high-minded and perhaps I have at times not allowed scripture to speak. I admit this, and to my chagrin must concede that God does *care* for both the elect and the reprobate. Early on, I would have likely denied this precept, perhaps taking my Calvinism much *higher* than the scriptural warrant. Much of this high-mindedness comes from the reformed tendency to use the word grace in connection with God’s providential care for the just and the unjust.

God’s providence, that is his care for the world extends to both the just and the unjust. He is the ultimate cause of all things that come to pass. In sending rain and sunshine, we must accept the premise that God does not withhold his providential care. In the comings and goings of both the elect and the reprobate God is worthy to be praised for his kindness.

3.Semantics and Common Grace

In contradistinction to the philosophical school of thought known as post-structuralism; Christians should argue that words do in fact have a fixed referent. The objection might be raised that arguing over the concept of common grace over against what I would advocate i.e. common providence is simply an exercise of linguistic sleight-of-hand. As alluded to above, I would still hold [with perhaps more sophisticated understanding] that the term “common grace” has been used equivocally in describing God’s providence. Linguistically, I would be reticent to ascribe the term charis to the reprobate. The untoward consequence of using the term charis as a descriptor of God’s disposition toward the reprobate allows for hypothetical universalism and an irrational notion of dualism with respect the well-meant offer of the gospel.

What does all this mean? Practically speaking it means that language is more than a mere conceptualization of non-descriptive properties. Grace [charis] entails more than simple providence, in fact bound up in the concept of grace is loving-kindness. On the other hand providence is the management of all sorts of states of affairs with respect to God’s creatures [elect and reprobate]. On reductionist terms, this means that *grace* must mean something less than loving-kindness and by extension we are guilty of equivocation if the terms have no fixed meaning. Accepting God’s providence does not negate his careful administration of the world that he has created, while ascribing to this administration the term grace, imports a disposition in God that is at odds with the perspicuous teaching of Holy Writ.[ cf. Psalm 2:4, Proverbs 1:26]

 

3i. Common Grace: Is it Salvific?

 

Reformed theologians should be most concerned with the tendency for Common Grace to be thought of as something more than providence. This concern was shared by Abraham Kuyper, perhaps the most well-known proponent of common grace. The fear was and seems to remain that the terms *common* and *special* grace will be conjoined. Sadly, in many circles the prescience of Kuyper has been realized. Common Grace is conjoined in a manner that often obfuscates the special nature of grace that leads to salvation. The confluence of these terms has led by good and necessary consequence to the notion that God makes a sincere offer of salvation to those that he has decreed would never come to salvation. In other words, common grace can become a sort of quasi-prevenient that is universal in scope. Common Grace proponents might demur on this point, however the indiscernible differentiation between prevenient grace and common grace posits the same outcome for the reprobate. God is gracefully working in the hearts of the reprobate leading them toward salvation even though *Calvinists* would say they cannot ultimately come and *Arminians* would argue that they must decide to accept or reject the wooing of the Spirit.

 

As a consequence, both Common Grace and Prevenient Grace implicitly deny that election takes place as an unchanging decree. Common Grace allows for good works in the reprobate ultimately stopping short of salvation though one could argue that this decision was determined a priori, it seems logical to conclude that this premise conjoined with a sincere offer of salvation on God’s part leads by necessity to a hypothetical and contingent salvation based on a decision to accept or reject God’s grace in salvation. Thus irrationality is ascribed to God in both schemes. Prevenient grace posits salvation [and thus election] based on foreseen faith while common grace posits election based on a foreseen lack of faith.

Perhaps, the objection could be raised that this is not at all what is meant by common grace. In the original sense of the term, perhaps this is a fair rejoinder. However, accepting both common grace and the sincere offer of the gospel effectively changes the meaning of the first term. Preferentially, the term common grace would be better understood as providence. This seems to allow for God’s goodness as demonstrated toward the elect and the reprobate while denying sincerity in the gospel offer to those who will never come.

The Existence of God

This is a different form of the ontological argument. It owes its existence in part to Immanuel Kant and in another part to the work of Calvinist philosophers. It is called “presuppositional” because it argues from the coherence of Christian presuppositions. The construction is not principally positive but rather works via negativa.  (Editorial note: I have included what I regard as the most erudite objections to the argument and have included my replies to various interlocutors)

A presupposition has to do with what a speaker presupposes to be true when making a claim. Thus, we presuppose many things in ordinary non-controversial speech that are never subjected to a rigorous philosophical and/or logical examination.

My own humble contribution to the argument was to apply the “projection” framework used in other philosophical disciplines in order to show the projection of Christian presuppositions with respect to the question of the existence of God.  Projection roughly has to do with what is embedded in the presupposition. Consider the following rough outline of the Presupposition contained in sentence (1) with the associated embedded content of (2-8)

1) God exists and is immutable, invariant, and universal

2) God is identifiable and salient

3) The universe contains laws that are immutable, invariant, and universal

3a. Laws of logic are immutable, invariant, and universal

3b. Laws of logic are identifiable and salient

4. God does not exist (negation)

5.It is possible that the universe came about by random chance (modal possibility)

6.If God does not exist then chance does not entail universal, immaterial, and invariant laws (conditional antecedent)

7.If laws of logic are universal, invariant, and universal then very likely God exists (probability adverb)

8.Laws of logic are universal, invariant, and universal therefore the Christian believes God exists (belief operator)

In classic logic, sentences 2-5 may not follow deductively however when considering sentence (1) the various operators denoted above are embedded in sentences (2), (3) (3a.)(3b.) There has been considerable thought given to the nature of presuppositions. For the purposes of Christian apologetics, it should be noted that negation or denial of our opponent’s presuppositions is tantamount to the Van Tillian method of apologetics.

In ordinary speech, the speaker generally assumes “common ground” with his or her hearers, this could be thought of as pragmatic presuppositions. Once the presupposition has been communicated it generally accepted that the hearer either implicitly accepts or explicitly denies the speakers’ presupposition. When a presupposition fails to project, or in other words when all of the embedded propositions do not follow the presupposition is said to be canceled.

Objection #1
At first glance it’s hard to know which part of this he considers the “presupposition.” I know which part, in fact, he considers to be the assumption by the nature of logical proofs; that is, he is assuming a negation by way of ID to prove that the preceding premises are valid. However, for a moment, I’d like to address the premises. In P1 I see three predicates assigned to God – immutability, invariability and universality.

Answer #1

Perhaps reverting back to the original form will prove helpful. God exists and is immutable, invariant, and universal. This is a sentence, but to put it in logical form let us dispense with the copula and consider this as conjunction of p & q.

p God exists
q God is immutable, invariant, and universal

Obviously, if we consider p & q on their own merits, we have formally committed ourselves to something that intuitively seems amiss. However, and this is important the argument is proceeding presuppositionally. Let’s us reconsider this in terms of the presuppositions of p & q. Let (ps) stand for a presupposition and p & q stand for what has been offered previously.

If one accepts the plugs, holes, and filter roles of presuppositions (as I do) then it will become apparent that this is not at all problematic for the presuppositional apologist. In this case logically this would look like this ps(p) & (p->ps(q)). The predicates in the conjunction (q) are satisfied in (p). By the way this bears upon what R.L ( interlocutor). follows up with, if-then sentences are filtered in the same way.

All of the sentences (1-8) are a part of the utterances of someone that presupposes the Christian worldview. This is not say that in terms of classic logic these presuppositions are going to follow deductively per se. This is not the intention of the argument that was proffered. The actual argument is that Christian presuppositions project, they have compositionality. In contradistinction, the atheist must subject his or her presuppositions to the same scrutiny. Do the presuppositions of atheism project? Can they provide a coherent composition on the whole from the presuppositions of the parts?

Objection #2

 Are you confusing the “laws of logic” aka “laws of thought” with the facts they may represent (e.g the fact of identity)?

Answer #2

This is perhaps the most interesting component of your objection. IT assumes the validity of the law of identity. The LI is given a place of primacy among both theists and atheists alike, and seems to be taken as a given. However, this so-called law is problematic on at least two counts.

1.The law of identity, is merely rhetorical. Asserting that x=x is a tautology, substitute any number of subjects for (x) and the nature of the case becomes clear. A cow is a cow, a car is a car, and so on ad infinitum.

2.The difficulty is that x is the subject and is linked by the word “is” in logic this called a copula. However when in this case, the instantiation does not refer to a property of the object (or a predicate) but attempts to instantiate the subject as a property of the subject.

So, to be clear there is no confusion with respect to confusing the law of identity with other laws of logic. Consider for a moment the law of contradiction. The law of contradiction says that p is not ~p. This entails the subject and the predicates that attach to p, and by way of negation as p and every predicate regarding p cannot be the same as ~p. Repeating p=p is just that repetition.

Objection #3

What do you mean when you say “The universe contains laws…”? Where are these laws contained? How are they contained?

Answer # 3

Laws of logic are abstract entities. Asking where or how they are contained would be akin to asking where ghosts reside. They are not “contained” anywhere, this highlights a key problem when considering laws of logic in the atheistic scheme. According to atheism laws of logic by necessity must be contained in minds, which I take to have material equivalence with a person’s brain. Thus, laws of logic are reduced to chemical interactions and certain brain states and posits the mind-brain identity theory. However, for you and I to use laws of logic in rational discourse we must have the same brain state, meaning of course that laws of logic ultimately cannot be trusted.

Objection #4

You say “It is possible that the universe came about by random chance”. How do you know this is possible? Do you believe randomness is possible?

Answer #4

Re-read the post on Presuppositions and Projection, (5) is modal possibility based on (4) and the conditional antecedent (6) the implicatures of (1-3a,b,c) bear upon (4,5,6) and determine whether Christian presuppositions project. I am not nor would I argue for randomness outside of its modal possibility, one that is negated because it entails the non-existence of God.

Objection #5

If we take the cosmological argument, the necessity of a creator cannot be induced, for it employs observation by the assistance of the principle of sufficient reason to infer that God is necessary.

Answer #5

This is a lovely objection and one that sounds quite convincing. However, the eventual luster is a mere facade as this misses the mark. As a thought experiment let us pretend that all contingent beings are inside a large circle. Let’s label this set (a) and allow (a) to stand for all contingent beings in the world. What might we suppose is the sufficient reason for any particular contingent being (b) well simply put, some other contingent being (c). We can provide the sufficient reason for (b) which is of course (c). However what is the sufficient reason for (a)? The set of all contingent beings simply cannot be contingent on (b,c) but according to this objection [found also in J.L. Mackie’s work,The Miracle of Theism] there must be sufficient reason for the set of all contingent beings. What options do we have? Do posit a contingent being outside of the circle? This cannot be so, since any contingent being must by necessity be a part of set (a). Philosophers including Richard Taylor have stated that it is odd and arbitrary to consign sufficient reason to every other contingent being while deny this status to the *world*.

Objection # 6

 Whether you believe reality to be an assumption, or dependent on the mind, or independent of the mind, the fact remains that, if you assert that X cannot exist without Y, the necessity of Y must be logically argued. 

Answer #6

This is a non-sequitur. The presuppositional apologist does not argue that laws of logic cannot exist without God. The presuppositional apologist (PA) argues that based on God’s self-disclosed revelation, the laws of logic are coherent as immaterial, invariant, abstract entities. The necessary implication of God’s self-disclosure has the PA conjoining his/her epistemological pre-commitments with his/her metaphysical pre-commitments rescuing him/her from utter skepticism.

Objection # 7

Show us how X works without God. But this implies the necessity of God; it doesn’t actually demonstrate that without God, for instance, laws of logic are impossible.

Answer #7

There is considerable confusion belied in this objection. The PA is arguing that the laws of logic are internally consistent when the Christian worldview is taken as whole, or a system of thought. Our epistemology presupposes and is entailed by our metaphysics. The PA is not asking for a demonstration of the impossibility of the laws of logic without God, rather the PA is asking for an accounting of the internal consistency of abstract entities in the atheistic worldview. The nuanced difference is remarkable. The question is one of final authorities and the PA is asking for the anti-theist to provide *at* the presuppositional level the final authority by which metaphysical and epistemological skepticism can be avoided. The Christian God is the final authority for the PA, and since the question is one of competing epistemology, the question is both fair and reasonable.

Objection #8

We presuppose God – check. Then, we presuppose that logic is universal and dependent on God – check. Then we presuppose that without God, nothing is intelligible – check. It’s a chain of presuppositions ad infinitum. 

Answer #8

This a common, albeit misguided objection. We cannot simply presuppose anything we want, since our presuppositions must allow for consistent application of everything we subsume under the heading of knowledge. The argument that logic is dependent upon God may in some sense be true, the way that the objection is formulated misses an important distinction.  Rather, the argument is an indirect proof, offering an assumption to derive a contradiction which leads to the conclusion that the original assumption is false. The presupposition of the non-existence of God according to the PA leads to a contradiction that indirectly proves that the aforementioned assumption is false.  In the last sentence, you seem to equivocate between presuppositional apologetics and foundationalism. This is a recent refrain from atheists interacting with PA methodology but the objection does not attain since it is arguing against something foreign to PA.

 

 

 

 

 

 

A Puritan Philosopher: The Cosmological Argument of Jonathan Edwards

 

A different kind of Cosmological Argument.

At age 19 Jonathan Edwards wrote an article entitled “Of being”. This was a short, but incisive article dealing with matters of being.

He postulates that perfect nothingness is conceptually impossible. For example if one is to attempt to think about perfect nothing, they normally imagine black “space” devoid of light. This however is not perfect nothing, as it is something that the mind is conceptualizing. Further Edwards asserts that perfect nothing is the negation of all propositions.

 

Either nothing existed which would negate all geometry,any universal law, and any proportion whatsoever or everything existed in God’s mind. The former part of this proposition assumes that the atheist must accept either the eternality of the universe or accept the negation of all propositions before all matter and propositions came into being. If that were true, then the laws of physics *appeared ex post facto which seems absurd or they were already in existence which negates the proposition.

p: absolute nothing existed
q: no propositions existed
r: all propositions present in God’s mind
p –> q (r v p)
~p :. r

In a naturalistic model, the ontology of immaterial laws must be thought of as an abstraction from the ontology of the material universe. In other words creation ex-nihilo via a naturalistic framework must include laws that are abstract from the processes that they govern.

In a theistic model, propositions and laws are existent a priori as they exist in God’s mind. The material world is fashioned in response to the immaterial laws that already exist. This seems the to be the only plausible way to conceptualize creation ex-nihilo.

The Problem of Universals

 

The Medieval problem of universals is a bit of a misnomer. The problem did not begin with medieval philosophers nor were they able to solve the problem.  This should not discourage the inquiry as a continuous grappling with philosophical topics is normative.  Perhaps they at one time looked upon their for-bearers such as Plato and Aristotle with the same kind of curious retrospection that the modern philosopher does with Boethius, Aquinas, and Duns Scotus.

Philosopher R.I. Aaron says this about universals “THERE have been periods when the problem of universals was the dominating theme of philosophical speculation. One such period was the medieval; another was that of Plato and Aristotle” (Aaron vii)

Is there really a problem of universals? Some philosophers have argued that the problem of universals is not really a problem at all. Other philosophers are more circumspect and view universals as a real problem that confronts philosophy.  The problem of universals is similar to the problem of induction. There are arguments to be made for both positions.  Prior to moving on to possible solutions to the problem it is interesting to note that there have always been skeptics who have questioned whether the business of universals is even worthy to be called philosophy; perhaps the whole affair is superfluous.

Philosopher Charles Landsmen offers a common sense approach to the problem he writes “It is a truism that there is such a thing as recurrence or repetition in nature.” (Landesman 8)  He goes on to point out that in nature colors and shapes are repeated throughout.  Consider the following statement an apple is red.  This statement applies not only to an individual apple in particular but to many apples generally.  Thus the problem of universals is simply the problem of recurrence.  This seems to be axiomatic ergo no additional proof is needed to establish that a problem truly exists.

There are really only a finite number of possible responses to the problem of universals. On one hand you have the exaggerated realist. On the other hand, you have the nominalist.  Throughout the centuries there have been various incantations of these views.  From moderate nominalism to moderate realism the problem of universals has in no way had a universal response.

In order to properly discuss universals one must have a working knowledge of at least some of the terms that are used in relation to the various views. According to the Catholic Encyclopedia there are four main views. The first view addressed by the Catholic Encyclopedia is exaggerated realism. This is the view that there are universal concepts in the mind as well as universal phenomena in nature.  In other words, the universal concepts in the mind are similar if not exactly the same as the things in nature.

In medieval thought there were two forms of realism. One was the aforementioned exaggerated realism and the other was a more moderate form of realism. In medieval philosophy realism represented a position taken on the problem of universals. According to the Columbia Encyclopedia

 Extreme realism, represented by William of Champeaux, held that universals exist independently of both the human mind and particular things—a theory closely associated with that of Plato. Some other philosophers rejected this view for what can be termed moderate realism, which held that universals exist only in the mind of God, as patterns by which he creates particular things. St. Thomas Aquinas and John of Salisbury were proponents of moderate realism. (“Realism, in Philosophy”)

Nominalism on the other hand denies the existence of universal concepts and asserts that many particular things lumped together are simply a set.  By way of analogy if I assert that Dan is a man and my neighbor Brian is a man this is not positing a universal.  For the nominalist the term ‘man’ is a mere term or definition.  Man is a particular and refers to a bundle of properties all of which are particulars.

Conceptualism is an intermediate position between nominalism and realism.  For the conceptualist universals have no independent existence thus agreeing with nominalism.  However, the conceptualist can agree that with the realist in acknowledging that universals exist albeit as a concept in the mind. This was the view that was propounded by Peter Abelard.  The Columbia Encyclopedia notes that with some slight variations conceptualism becomes moderate realism.

Plato sought investigate the concept of universals in the Parmenides.  The Platonic conception of universals was that particulars all participate in the universal.  Take for an example a circle. Many common items are circular. All of these particular circular items participate in the ideal circle. This ideal circle is not something that we experience; however the phenomena of our experience participate in the universal ideal of a circle. Thus the Platonic theory of universals presupposes the Platonic theory of the forms.

Aristotle objected to at least one aspect of Plato’s reasoning. He did not believe that the statement “universals exist” was true apart from the existence of the particulars.  For Aristotle universals existed however they only existed in so far as the particular existed. Theodore Scaltsas writes “that is called universal whose nature is to belong to a number of things” (Scaltsas 28). The universal was universal because it was a property of multiple particulars not because it participated in a form or ideal.

The problem of universals resurfaces in the middle ages.  According to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Porphyry proposed a number of questions related to the problem of universals.  These questions were undertaken by Boethius who interacted with the question by producing two commentaries on Porphyry’s writings.

The work by Porphyry was intended as an introduction. In fact, the name Isagoge is Latin for introduction. The work was specifically designed to introduce Aristotle to beginners.  Philosopher John Marenbon says this “Porphyry believed that, even before they read the Categories using his simpler, question-and-answer commentary, beginners required an introduction to the terms and concepts used in these works.” (Marenbon 23) Porphyry has three questions that he posits in the Isagoge. He refuses to answer these questions as the book is after all intended for beginners.  Nevertheless, the three famous questions which seemed to be the catalyst for two commentaries from Boethius are as follows: “(1) Do they exist or do they consist only in bare concepts? (2) If they exist, are they bodies or are they incorporeal? (3) If they are incorporeal, are they separated from sensible things, or do they exist in, and in connection with, them?” (Marenbon 24)

The first treatment that Boethius offers is regarding the question of whether genera and species exist or whether they consist only in bare concepts. To wit, Boethius replies that Porphyry would not have asked the second question if there were some doubt as to whether or not they exist.

The resolution to the first question for Boethius seems to be that because universals are part of everything that exists in some fashion they must exist therefore they cannot be mere thoughts. The second question is about whether or not they are corporeal or incorporeal.  Boethius rejects an either/or and embraces both. Boethius says “There are species, differentiae, propria, and accidents that are corporeal (for example, human being, four-footed, ability-to-laugh, curly-hairedness) and those that are incorporeal (for example, God, rational, ability-to-add-up, knowledge); genera, because they may have corporeal and incorporeal species, are neither corporeal nor incorporeal, on this view. (Marenbon 26)

Boethius then formulates an argument to address the problem of universals with a number of premises. He winds up arguing that the problem is solved by abstraction.  Genera and species exist in individuals or particulars but when thought about are universals.  Fr. Copleston says it this way “they subsist in sensible things, but are understood without bodies.”(Copleston 138)  Boethius was offering a solution that would find further expression later in St. Thomas Aquinas.

St. Thomas Aquinas formulated what might be called moderate realism. Aquinas was reacting to exaggerated realism. Consider the following quote:

“If you ask,” says St. Thomas, “whether that nature (humanity, or human nature considered in the absolute or abstract) can be characterized as one, or as many, I answer that it cannot be described as either one or many, because each of these attributes lies outside the concept of humanity, and either can happen to be verified of it. For if plurality were essential to it, it could never be singular, whereas it is singular as found, for example, in Socrates. And similarly if unity were essential to it as conceived by the intellect then it would be numerically one and the same nature in Socrates and Plato, for example, and could not be multiplied in a multiplicity of individuals.” 1″ (Coffey 270)

 

St. Thomas is reacting to the notion that universals have existence independent of particulars. In other words, for each instance of a universal such as red the particulars participate in the universal. Shades of red are all particular examples of the universal known as red.  The previous quote from St. Thomas illustrates this point.  If man is a universal, then to say that Socrates is a man and Plato is a man in the sense of numerical oneness is to say that Socrates and Plato are the same man.

On the other end of the spectrum is the nominalist who denies the existence of universals all together.  The school of Roscelin asserted that universals were simply generalizations that come from experience.  This form of empiricism would have us believe that universals are based on observation of sense data.  Every example of the color red is an empirical experience that the mind inductively categorizes as red. Shades of red are based on facts that exist in the real world. Ergo, the universal “red” is not really a universal rather this refers to something that is experienced in the world of particulars.

Philosopher Gordon H. Clark says that Roscelin was “the first or at least chief of the early nominalists” (Clark 261). According to Dr. Clark Roscelin held that categories or species are simply words.  He asserts that for Roscelin the words are “flatus voices, the breathing of the voice” (Clark 261).  This view leads Anselm to declare that Roscelin view of the Trinity was heretical due to his sensory epistemology. (cf. Clark 261)

As an interesting side note, Peter Abelard was something of a turncoat nominalist. Abelard studied under both William of Champeaux an extreme realist and Roscelin the nominalist.  Once again according to Dr. Clark Abelard’s concern for the Trinity drove him to formulate a compromise between nominalism on the one hand and realism on the other.

For the medieval philosopher the idea of universals was found in the study of the ancient Greeks. The various notions of universals as presented by Plato and Aristotle and perhaps antecedently by Thales; are evaluated by the aforementioned thinkers.  There are certainly others who address the topic of universals and particulars however for the sake of brevity only a handful was covered.  The challenge for the aspiring philosopher is best expressed by turning one final time to Dr. Gordon H. Clark. He recalls “an oracular professor of logic once told his class, as they opened to the first page of the textbook, that they could not understand the first chapter until after they had understood the last chapter” (Clark 89)

This seems to be true of the study of metaphysics. It seems to be very difficult to formulate a treatment of the particular i.e. nominalism, realism, or conceptualism without first understanding all of them. The implications for the theologian are multi-faceted.  What one believes about realism affects his or her doctrine of the Trinity, the fall, the nature of man and so on ad infinitum. The difficulty for medieval philosophers was attempting to maintain orthodoxy while carefully considering the concept of universals and particulars.  The options available several hundred years ago, by in large have been inculcated into the theologies of most modern scholars.

There is perhaps one exception and this is the thought of Dr. Cornelius Van Til.   Dr. Van Til’s notion of universals is found distinctly within the Christian worldview.  He begins by acknowledging the problem, he writes that “the whole problem of philosophy may be summed up in the question of the relation of unity to diversity” (Bahnsen 238)

As Dr. Bahnsen points out, universals must not be thought of as existing apart from God. Rather Dr. Bahnsen and Van Til advocate a different notion of universals. For Van Til, “universals exist in the concrete (not abstract) fashion within the mind of the personal Creator Himself” (Bahnsen 240).

Accordingly, if God thinks universally then man thinks analogically. This seems to be a completely different approach to the problem of universals as found in the other schools of philosophy.  The particulars then are not abstract but are rather derived from the universal nature of God.  This argues Van Til means that particulars are not only dependent on God they are also derived from his universal nature. In other words, there is a fundamental unity between the particulars and the universals.

This view of universals offers another solution to the problem.  The problem of universals is one that has been around for quite literally thousands of years. However, as outlined above, philosophers in the past have grappled with the notion of universals and particulars. Today as in the past philosophers are still considering the problem.

In conclusion, the problem of universals will likely never be solved. Plausible solutions aside, philosophy in the middle ages as well as the modern age continues to excite the imagination of theologians and philosophers.  The importance of understanding our philosophical for-bearers in the middle ages will inform our understanding of the problem and provide fodder for further philosophical inquiry.

 

References

Aaron, R. I. (1952). The Theory of Universals. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Retrieved April 18, 2010, from Questia database: http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=34031340

Bahnsen, Greg L. (Van Til’s Apologetic: Readings and Analysis Presbyterian and Reformed: New Jersey

Clark, Gordon H. (1957) Thales to Dewey: A History of Philosophy Houghton Mifflin Company: Cambridge

Coffey, P. (1917). Epistemology: Or the Theory of Knowledge: An Introduction to General Metaphysics (Vol. 1). New York: Longmans, Green. Retrieved April 18, 2010, from Questia database: http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=59632093

Realism, in Philosophy. (2009). In the Columbia Encyclopedia (6th Ed.). New York: Columbia University Press. Retrieved April 18, 2010, from Questia database: http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=117041694

Hartshorne, C. (1965). Anselm’s Discovery: A Re-Examination of the Ontological Proof for God’s Existence. La Salle, IL: Open Court. Retrieved April 18, 2010, from Questia database: http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=77587473

Jolivet, J. (1998). Chapter 2 From the Beginnings to Avicenna. In Medieval Philosophy, Marenbon, J. (Ed.) (pp. 29-48). London: Routledge. Retrieved April 18, 2010, from Questia database: http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=102934319

Landesman, C. (Ed.). (1971). The Problem of Universals. New York: Basic Books. Retrieved April 18, 2010, from Questia database: http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=101070605

Marenbon, J. (2003). Boethius. New York: Oxford University Press. Retrieved April 18, 2010, from Questia database: http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=105173548

Scaltsas, T. (1994). Substances and Universals in Aristotle’s Metaphysics. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Retrieved April 18, 2010, from Questia database: http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=103729245

 

Should all good Marxists go to hell?

 

“It would be easier, where property is well secured, to live without money than without poor; for who would do the work?” (Marx and Engels 162)These words do not belong to Karl Marx but he did quote them in his book The Communist Manifesto. Capitalism according to Marx is an oppressive system that simply bolsters the wealth of the capitalists. In communism, redistribution of wealth occurs avoiding the inequalities created by capitalism.  On the other hand, communism has led to totalitarian governments much more oppressive than capitalism. This dichotomy arises from the presuppositions entailed by both systems. One depends upon a religious and more specifically a Christian framework. The other system entails atheism and rejects religion as a tool of the oppressors. Capitalism entails Christian presuppositions that provide the impetus for self-interest while communism entails the dialectical materialism of Marx.

In contradistinction to many capitalists, the implicit Christian principles call for wealth redistribution.  The continued secularization of American culture has created a free market without the Christian conscience that previously addressed injustice and poverty. An economic theory much closer to Marxism will fill the void space and replace capitalism unless advocates of a market economy return to the Christian principles that address injustice and poverty created by capitalism.  Marxism has no such conscience and the vacuous removal of God leads to coercive redistribution of wealth at the hands of the state instead of the church.  If we are to save capitalism, those who claim to be following in the Judeo-Christian tradition must voluntary participate in helping the poor or in popular parlance redistributing wealth.

Philosophers and economists generally agree that Adam Smith is the founder of capitalism and is responsible for the first modern theory of economics.  The supposition that he is without disputation at least partially responsible for our system, that is for capitalism is widely accepted.  Adam Smith was well educated and trained as a philosopher. Thus, the system that we know as capitalism is at bottom a philosophical system.  The axiom upon which this philosophical system rests is theistic and implicitly Christian.  Whether or not Adam Smith was, a committed Christian is a subject of continued scholarly debate however; his own writings acknowledge the presence of a deity.

Smith writes, “Man is accountable to God and his fellow creatures. But tho’ he is, no doubt, principally accountable to God, in the order of time, he must necessarily conceive himself as accountable to his fellow creatures,” (Smith 130). These words penned by Smith acknowledge that man is subject to humanity as well as his creator. One of the hallmarks of Smith’s philosophy is his virtue ethics. The cultivation of virtues such as kindness and charity was the primary concern of much that Smith wrote. One of Smith’s works quoted above was entitled The Theory of Moral Sentiments and in this book; Smith outlines the moral presuppositions that will form the framework for his economic theory.

The founder of capitalism may have been concerned with virtue however, for many modern day capitalists the only virtue that is important is the virtue of selfishness. Modern day followers of Ayn Rand assert, “Money is the root of all good” (Rand) and are much more interested in the virtue of selfishness. Capitalism has empirically demonstrated that as a system of economics it is capable of generating great wealth. The wealth-creating engine of capitalism devoid of Christian principles is inclined toward inequality. The gulf between poverty and wealth continues to increase. Unfortunately many people have faulty notions regarding the essence of poverty. Recently R. Edward Freeman wrote, “The very idea of capitalism reinforces the notion that some are meant to be poor and some are meant to be rich” (Freeman) He notes that we fall into the dichotomy of either assuming that people’s only hope is the market economy or a government policy of wealth redistribution.

In addition to the economic inequality created by capitalism the United States is decidedly secularized. Formerly, charitable activities of religious groups counterbalanced the dichotomy of wealth and poverty. American society has shifted away from a theological grounding of morality into something all together different. The following quote from Francis Ryan in an article entitled Christianity and American Education illustrates the nature of the paradigmatic change “in a democratic society morality is shifted from the level of theological doctrine to the level of social relationships” (Ryan). Man was previously concerned with the well-being of his neighbor because it was his duty toward God. If the above quote is correct, the shift that has occurred makes one much less likely to consider those outside their direct sphere of influence. Thus, the plight of the impoverished is not tantamount to a person’s spiritual life.

The absence of God creates a void space. The uncomfortable truth is capitalism without God is unsustainable. In contradistinction to capitalism, the system formulated by Karl Marx depends upon and presupposes atheism. Vladimir Lenin, the noted Russian Marxist and Communist made this assertion regarding religion “Every religious idea, every idea of God, even flirting with the idea of God, is unutterable vileness” (Noebel 68). A fully developed Marxism required the eradication of God and religion. Marxism replaces God with something known as dialectical materialism. Essentially this is the doctrine that man is matter; meaning of course that man is not comprised of spirit. Materialists have no room for God who is by definition incorporeal.

There is a strong connection between Marxism and the theory of evolution. Unfortunately, the exegesis of such a connection would take precious time and space. Altruism as a component of both Darwinian evolution and atheism is non-sequitar. Atheist philosopher David Stove says that altruism “is an attribute which disposes its possessor to put the interests of others before its own” (Stove 184).The confluence of atheism and evolution precludes such a concern for others.  In addition to the overthrow of religion, Marxism depends upon the loss of individual or market freedom. In capitalism, the markets dictate the means of production and the supply drives demand. Some level of planning is present even in capitalism. Carmen Haider wrote an article entitled The Meaning of Economic Planning and points out planning entails an effort by a group of people that has a common end and purpose. (Haider) Using this definition as our guide it is easy to see that businesses employ planning nearly every day. However, planning in capitalism relies on the principles of freedom, supply, and demand.

On the other hand, a Socialist or Marxist economic system depends upon central planning. “Economic decisions regarding price, production, consumption, etc. are made by central planners affiliated with the government, whereas in capitalism, economic decisions are made by every producer and every consumer” (Noebel 679). By logical necessity, central planning depends on someone other than the consumer. This entails a fundamental loss of freedom over the market and free consumer choice. The lack of private property and the lack of consumer choice remove liberties. The unequivocal revocation of freedom is a ramification of a centrally planned economy. This is neither hyperbolic nor overstatement but the stark reality.

The coalescences of secularization and market-caused inequality coupled with the general apathetic attitudes of religious and non-religious people create the perfect void space. In more popular parlance, this means that our society has rejected the notion of God. As previously conveyed, Marxism depends on just such a confluence. In North America, secular humanism has catapulted this rejection of God into near light-speed. Evangelical scholar, theologian, and philosopher Carl F.H. Henry noted that secular humanism “disavows a transcendent deity as promotive of an arbitrary or despotic authority, and as an intolerable barrier to human freedom” (Henry)

The loss of transcendent values is the loss of Christianity itself. A lack of authority creates the void space. One author mentions that every age has been post-Christian but the culture was still decidedly Christian. This culture however is post-Christian in both senses. Consider this extended quote from author Gabriel Vahanian

Every age is post-Christian. But this has been true only theologically speaking; until modern times the formative tradition of Western culture has been continually imbued with the spirit of Christianity. Regardless of how approximately, our culture has been a variation on the translation of this spirit into the arts and the sciences, into a style of life. But the novelty, or tragedy, of our situation lies in the fact that our age is post-Christian both theologically and culturally. (Vahanian 229)

 

The situation is dramatically different and tragically dire. The loss of transcendent values both culturally and theologically is just the catalyst needed for drastic cultural change. The panacea of secularization must be either revival or replacement. The ancient forms and culture of Christian societies need revived so that self-interested capitalism has the necessary limiting factors or proto-Marxism will replace our economic and spiritual way of life.

The secularization of America argument has merit. The signs point to a continued decline in church membership and a rise of atheism. Despite this, the question remains can Christians rescue capitalism. While the antecedent does not require further explication, those faithful that remain have an enormous task. Nothing less than the salvation of our economic system will do. The failure to succeed in this task spells not only the end of the church but also the end of our way of life.

The intention is not to be doom-and-gloom or engage in prescient apocalyptic double speak. Rather, the point is to encourage a radical reappraisal of the nature of religion and economics. The church universal, meaning generically believers in God and specifically Christians, must accept a painful proposition. The proposition that the church must accept is its own blindness toward the plight of the poor. Furthermore, the church must acknowledge that capitalism creates inequalities. This is not to say that capitalism is inherently corrupt or that Marxism is somehow superior, neither of these premises is true. Acknowledging that something is not perfect does not necessarily entail the replacement of the some-thing. Religious people do need to grapple with the plight of the impoverished and resist the temptation to pretend that every single American is affluent.

Christians and those in the Judeo-Christian tradition are still free to choose how they spend their money. The real distinction is between coercive and free distribution of wealth. Coercive redistribution essentially entails taking someone’s wealth and giving it to another. Conversely, if believers of all stripes would do this voluntary the effects would be immediate. The implicit connection between people of faith and free markets should be apparent. The only viable alternative to free market economies on a large scale that would adequately feed and clothe the poor is Marxism. As previously mentioned Marxism depends upon the eradication of the immaterial and has no room for God. Either the instruments of poor relief reside in the hands of the government or they lie with those who claim to have faith. Perhaps some third way exists that would bridge these extremes but if man has learned anything from anthropology it is that human have a proclivity for extremes.

No matter where a person stands with respect to issues of social justice, one thing should be certain; Americans are fond of their liberties. The notion of free will while not philosophically tenable is the collective consciousness of most Americans. The logical conclusion is that coercive redistribution is inferior to voluntary redistribution. Much of this depends upon the modern day church and people of faith acknowledging the necessity of helping those finding themselves to be less fortunate.

The Christian response to poverty should be born from biblical principles. The New Testament book of James gives a clear warning to those who claim to be followers of Jesus and do not care for the poor. James says that the people who are not caring for the poor have a “dead” faith that unconnected with the God they seek to serve. In fact in some sense, the bible calls for voluntary redistribution of wealth. The book of Exodus provides instructions to the wealthy regarding caring for the poor. This doctrine of extending care to the less fortunate extends into the New Testament. In the book of Acts, the early church embraced a form of voluntary wealth distribution to members of the community.

A book review that appeared in the journal entitled Thought noted that Christian charity is a fundamental part of the Christian life. Consider this quote “Christian Charity is a mission from God to the world, a ca11 to special discipleship and following of the Lord.”  Charity and justice are among the prime directives for those in the Judeo Christian tradition. The Christian response to poverty is a calling from God to move into the world and help alleviate suffering. However,  there is an important distinction between justice and charity. Christians have begun to shift their thinking from charity to issues of justice. This change is subtle but it entails going beyond mere generosity extended to the poor from the rich. Justice demands that the poor have some level of access to the wealth generating historically reserved for rich nations (Partridge).

 

Hypothetically, an objection could be proffered regarding the myopia of only considering the Christian tradition. This has less to do with an exclusivist precommitment and more to do with the basic presuppositions of religions outside of Christianity. For instance, a commitment to Karma can do little to engender sympathy as the Hindu is simply paying for his sins from a former existence. This does not mean that Hinduism has no mechanism for dealing with the poor, though it is not the same sort of concern shared by the Christian, Jew, or Muslim. In addition to these concerns, capitalism has been most successful in the West and particularly in the United States. Therefore, the main participants in saving capitalism have to be those fully invested in its success.

Acknowledging the inequalities of Capitalism and the free market economy is difficult. The fact that some do not have as much as another is not to say that the system is inherently flawed. Identifying the flaw, we must acquiesce to the fact that the flaw is with people themselves. This is quite difficult especially when dealing with many of the deep-seated prejudices that are present during the discussion of wealth and poverty. Some would say that the poor are lazy or simply lack the education to get ahead. Others would disagree that their success depended upon the help of others.  These attitudes are profoundly troubling when and if they are present among religious people from the upper and middle classes. Embracing a hard dichotomy between financial success and failure only serves to institutionalize poverty and create generational constraints on people’s ability to become financially independent.

Today, many would advocate more regulation of the markets and demonize those who are successful. Unfortunately, in the end, this only punishes those creating employment and opportunity and this often translates to fewer lower wage earners thus perpetuating poverty. Christians living in the United States need to remember that our children are disproportionately affected by the inequalities created by free markets. Dr.Cornel West conveys this sentiment when he writes “A particularly shameful fact is that the United States has the highest percentage of children living in poverty of any rich nation: 20.5 percent, a figure that represents a 36 percent increase since 1970 and compares with 9 percent in Canada, 4 percent in Germany and 2 percent in Japan.” (West 342)

Capitalism is the hallmark of a democratic society and the salvation of capitalism depends upon religious people. In order for the economic presupposition of capitalism to continue, the voluntary redistribution of wealth from those who have abundance to those who are impoverished must increase. The fact that capitalism depends upon a Christian framework is without question, however the question of whether or not we can forestall the death of capitalism is not yet settled. Marxism cannot exist alongside religion. No less a Marxist than Joseph Stalin admitted this premise, therefore the secularization of America is also potentially the end of Capitalism. Much of this depends on the individual religious adherent. If believers accept this mantle and one-by-one religious people see the importance of offsetting the natural inequity implicit in free markets, then perhaps the death knell of Capitalism is premature.

On the other hand, continued inequality and further erosion of morality via secularization will create a vacuum such that Marxism will soon replace Capitalism. What will you do to prevent this from happening? More importantly, we must ask are rich religious believers more interested in money or God.

 

 

 

Works Cited

Burkett, Phillip H. “The State of the Poor .” Thought (1929): 319-325. pdf .

Freeman, R. Edward. “Poverty and the Politics of Capitalism .” The Ruffin Series of the Society for Business Ethics (1998): 31-35. document .

Haider, Carmen. “The Meaning of Economic Planning .” Thought (1933): 101-107 .

Marx, Karl and Friedrich Engels. The Communist Manifesto . New York : Oxford University Press , 1992 .

Noebel, Dr. David. Understanding the Times . Eugene : Harvest House Publishers , 1997.

Partridge, Christopher. Dictionary of Contemporary Religion in the Western World . Downers Grove : Inter Varsity Press , 2002.

Rand, Ayn. Atlas Shrugged . New York : Penguin , 1957.

Ryan, Francis A. “Christianity and American Education .” Thought (1950 ): 562-563. document .

Smith, Adam. The Theory of Moral Sentiments. London : George Bell and Sons , 1892.

Stove, David. Darwinian Fairytales. New York : Encounter , 1995.

Vahanian, Gabriel. The Death of God: The Culture of our Post-Christian Era . New York : George Braziller, 1961.

West, Cornel. The Cornel West Reader. New York: Basic Civitas Books, 1999.

Nietzsche on Slave Morality

 

If we are to believe Shakespeare’s dictum that the pen is mightier than the sword then Friedrich Nietzsche wields Excalibur. He writes with a passion that few have matched. One of the areas where Nietzsche most excels at evisceration is morality. He details two kinds of morality, master and slave. In order to understand slave morality one must understand master morality.

For Nietzsche, master morality is differentiated from slave morality in that “The master morality equates ‘good’ to worldly success: achieving one’s goals of conquest, fame, wealth, and adventure, and embodying pride, strength, passion, and guiltless joy.” (Belliotti 45) In other words, master morality does not divide along lines of good and evil. The masters are aristocracy that sees the good in the actions that bring about prosperity. This form of morality takes the word ‘good” to mean something akin to ‘noble’ (Nietzsche, 1998). Conversely, the word ‘bad’ according to Nietzsche does not mean evil in the sense that commoners use the word. In modern parlance, the aristocracy does not look down upon looking down at someone so long as they are lower in class. Fully functioning master morality is ‘ex-lex’ with respect to the plebeian.

Slave morality on the other hand is a “morality of utility” (Nietzsche, 1998). This means that the virtues of the slaves are essentially those that help them endure the oppression of the masters. For the oppressed warm- heartedness, kindness, pity, and charity, represents an existential pacifier. These virtues are quite repulsive to the masters and ruled vices by those in power. The hallmark of the slave morality is an unrequited distrust of the aristocracy and all that those in power hold in high regard.  The slave even goes so far as to convince himself that “even their happiness is not genuine” (Nietzsche, 1998).  The slave does not believe that those things, which the powerful hold in high regard, are actually virtuous. As Nietzsche says the slave, even calls into question the supposed happiness of powerful. The oppressed do not want to believe that the oppressors can live peaceably in the context of their being masters.

Nietzsche’s parade of horribles begins with a reversal of the Christian fruits of the spirit and ends with freedom. He writes, “The longing for freedom, an instinct for the happiness and nuances of feeling free, is as necessarily a part of the slave morals and morality as artistic, rapturous reverence and devotion invariably signal an aristocratic mentality and judgement” (Nietzsche, 1998).  The slave only retains a desire for freedom due to living under the oppression of the aristocracy. This desire for freedom is a desire to be in some way free of the oppressive conditions and finds its counterpart in the expression of reverence and devotion among the masters.

Nietzsche certainly seems to prefer the master morality to the slave morality. He worries that the slave morality tends toward “dogmatism and universalism, which deny the rank order among humans and undermine social conditions necessary for excellence.” (Belliotti, 1998) This means that the herd looks for a common expression of unity like those found in religions like Christianity. Nietzsche says this has a stifling affect on humans who would look to find their own way in the absence of a dogma. Additionally, Nietzsche believed that the herd would become brutes more concerned with being clever and eventually the herd would be  more clever than their masters.

The slave morality is the morality of the common member of the herd. At bottom, a utility morality is an ointment of gentleness and respect designed to soothe the psyche of the oppressed.  Slave morality is a revolting proposition and a despicable lot to the masters. The morality of fear that posits good and evil and according to Nietzsche slave morality is a morality we should strive to overcome.

 

 

Works Cited

 

Bellioti, R. (1998 ). Stalking Nietzsche . Westport : Greenwood Press.

Nietzsche, F. (1998). Beyond Good and Evil . New York :

Oxford University Press .

 

Scientism: A review of Edward Feser’s indictment of Scientism

 

Blinded by Scientism and Recovering Sight after Scientism

A review of Edward Feser’s indictment of Scientism

 

In the 1980’s pop musical group Thomas Dolby had a hit song that included the rather catchy refrain “She blinded me with science”[1].  Nearly forty years later Philosopher Edward Feser has asserted with considerable vigor that the lights have gone out not just on hormonal techno-pop stars but on culture writ large.  In two articles his project is to convince us that scientism is either trivially true or self-defeating.[2]

The first thing that Feser does is to proffer a definition of scientism. Essentially, scientism is the “view that all real knowledge is scientific knowledge”[3] The definition is interesting as it uses the term ‘view’ as opposed to ‘belief’. While view and belief are synonyms the connotation of belief is altogether different than that of a view. The choice of words is important especially given Feser’s acknowledgement that much of culture has inculcated a rudimentary form of scientism that posits an insoluble dichotomy between ‘faith’ and ‘reason’.

Feser argues persuasively that scientism like positivism cannot substantiate its own claims based on the very principles that it asserts as a precondition. In order to do this, Feser argues from a presuppositional perspective. This presuppositional critique begs for explication as it may not be unambiguous at first blush. In order for Feser’s critique of scientism to demonstrate Q.E.D. that scientism is self-defeating he must show that scientism’s presuppositions do not project. A robust discussion of projection is most likely outside of the scope of this review but suffice to say that presuppositions that do not project ultimately reduce to absurdity.

The counterclaim that Feser is making is not necessarily deductive nor positive but rather inductive and negative. In other words, since science presupposes the uniformity of nature or in Feser’s words that the “world is governed by causal regularities”[4] any attempt to justify these presuppositions must commit the adherent of scientism to the fallacy of petitio principii.  Here is where Feser could have made an even stronger modal claim.  If scientism cannot rationally justify its own presuppositions, then science does not provide the preconditions of intelligibility necessary to make any epistemic claim whatsoever. Not only is scientism self-defeating it lacks the rational machinery to make epistemological claims of knowledge. Scientism fails to obtain because it has moved from its moorings into the deeper waters of metaphysics and in so doing must have a way to evaluate metaphysical claims. Feser points out that questions of universals and particulars finds no satisfactory response from scientism. [5]

The second horn of the dilemma and the counterargument from F.A. Hayek can be conjoined and remain succinct. The second horn of the dilemma seems more difficult for scientism.  If philosophy must be employed in order to justify the presuppositions of science then philosophy is the antecedent tool that must be utilized by science. However, as Feser acknowledges advocates of scientism may well concede this point by subsuming philosophy under the genus of science[6]. Simply put, there is no unambiguous and non-controversial way for science to maintain such a taxonomy.

The counterargument offered by Feser that finds its genesis in Hayek is that scientism is viciously reductionist. All immaterial aspects of human experience must be consigned to subjectivity. Feser’s rejoinder to such a reductionist program is to remind science that science is catalyzed by the very immaterial ‘events’ that it distills down into subjectivity. Any claim to objectivity is merely a poorly disguised subjectivity if scientism eliminates the incorporeal mind and identifies thought with the interactions of biochemical neurotransmitters.

 

 

Feser succeeds because scientism fails to acknowledge its debt to philosophy. Metaphysics has been disparaged by contemporary science as phantasms and the domain of religious speculation. However, Feser proffers a quote from E.A. Burtt that should serve as the only rejoinder needed to dispense with such an assertion. Burtt says this about metaphysics “even the attempt to escape metaphysics is no sooner put in the form of a proposition than it is seen to involve highly significant metaphysical postulates”[7]

In essence those who eschew metaphysics will incline themselves to elevate their own methodology into a pseudo form of metaphysics. In a real sense this is where speculative metaphysics begins and science ends. To that end, science in the absence of metaphysics must replace metaphysics with method, something that simply cannot be done.

The recovery of one’s vision entails a return to philosophy. The quote from John Kekes is apropos if we are to have our sight restored. The “paradigm of rationality”[8] is not to be found in science qua science but in philosophy generally and metaphysics particularly. We shall remain in the pall of smoke from the fire burning in Plato’s cave until such time as scientism is considered the type and shadow and not the bright sun of philosophy.

Feser’s article reminds the philosopher that philosophy is the rightful heir to evaluating the presuppositions of science. Lady Philosophy was handled roughly by the ancient sophists in much the same way she is being mistreated by the new school sophists of scientism.

 

References

Dolby, T. (1982). She Blinded me with Science [Recorded by T. Dolby]. London, England.

Feser, E. (2010, March 12). Blinded by Scientism. Retrieved from The Public Discourse : http://www.thepublicdiscourse.com

Feser, E. (2010, March 12). Recovering Sight after Scientism. Retrieved from The Public Discourse : http://www.thepublicdiscourse.com

[1] Dolby, T. (1982). She Blinded me with Science [Recorded by T. Dolby]. London, England.

[2] Feser, E. (2010, March 12). Blinded by Scientism. Retrieved from The Public Discourse : http://www.thepublicdiscourse.com

[3] Ibid, pg. 1

[4] Ibid, pg. 2

[5] Ibid, pg. 2

[6] Ibid, pg. 5

[7] Feser, E. (2010, March 12). Recovering Sight after Scientism. Retrieved from The Public Discourse : http://www.thepublicdiscourse.com pg. 4

[8] Ibid, pg. 3

 

 

Jones: Ultimate and Proximate Causation

 

Yesterday, in a discussion of an ancillary issue surrounding abortion one of the participants (y) said (x) is a baby killer. As one would assume, (x) objected to the assertion and said that (y) had wrongly accused him (x) of something that he had not committed. Initially, we can agree with (x) and perhaps reject (y’s) claim as superficially wrong and in poor form with respect to debate.(note: This is not the actual utterance but close enough to till the philosophical soil of this post)

However, in contradistinction to such a conclusion, one could argue for (y) that in a sense his claim was in fact wrong superficially but correct fundamentally.

As an example let’s take Jones:

Jones allows his children to play near a busy state highway. Jones does nothing to interfere with his children playing adjacent to the road even though many cars and trucks pass by at a high rate of speed. Everything proceeds without incident until one day, Jones’ youngest daughter inexplicably runs into the street. Sadly, for Jones, his daughter is struck.

The outcome: Jones is the ultimate cause of his daughter being struck (UC). The driver of the vehicle is the proximate cause (PC). If we looked at this logically, the (PC) entails the (UC) since the (PC) is dependent upon the (UC) having no conditional counterfactual.

For the sake of argument, a conditional counterfactual could be any number of if-then clauses. For example, if Jones would have placed a fence, then his daughter would not have had access to the road. Another might be if Jones had lobbied for reduced speeds then his daughter might have been seen. The conditional counterfactual negates the role Jones’ plays in being the ultimate cause. Certainly, Jones was not the proximate cause (barring Jones being the driver of the car). However, as much as it might be emotionally damaging to Jones, he is the ultimate cause.

In the same way, the above example while emotionally disconcerting follows the same path of causal entailment. Pro-choice advocates are generally not the proximate cause of the termination of a woman’s pregnancy. However, it is nonetheless true that in the absence of a conditional counterfactual (being pro-life for instance) they are the ultimate cause. If one can rationally assent to the proposition that Jones is the cause of his daughter being struck (bearing in mind his status of UC in the absence of a conditional counterfactual) one must also accept this entailment in the case of abortion.

 

Subaltern groups and Recognition

Struggles for Recognition

Prefatory comments: This post has been edited and recast in order to address a cultural issue that is front and center for many people today. The issue of transgender and the demand for recognition is one that must be understood not merely from superficiality. The underlying presuppositions and the explicit demand for recognition are philosophical. Certainly, there are cultural considerations but these are the effect not the cause. Please note “subaltern groups” is not the author’s term.

Many people have likely never heard the name Jürgen Habermas; certainly his writings are mostly relegated to those with a philosophical predilection. However, recent events both socially and politically may necessitate a closer inspection or at least a passing acquaintance with his philosophy. While a biography might prove helpful, suffice is to say that Habermas is associated with Frankfurt school of Philosophy. [1]

Again, the meaningfulness of this is likely lost but this school has been both exalted and vilified dependent upon the political and philosophical leanings of the person queried. Some on the “far right” whatever that means have vilified the Frankfurt school as the instigator of both Political Correctness and Cultural Marxism. On the “far left” the Frankfurt school is viewed as a corrected form of Marxism whereby Soviet socialism and Western capitalism have been critiqued for any number of reasons. My project is to embrace neither pole; rejecting both the conspiracy theory laden interpretation of the “far right” and the rather absurd notion that Marxism is anything less than fatally flawed.

It is my contention that Habermas may well have provided us with some interesting clues as to the implicit presuppositions of the new liberalism that have provided the catalyst for the seismic cultural shift that has overwhelmed both the mainstream media and of course social media over the last few years. Before turning to Habermas, it should be noted that the impetus for his comments are in response to Charles Taylor.

Charles Taylor and Recognition

It is Taylor who provides the main thesis for Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition and Habermas sees points of agreement but also offers several rejoinders along the way.  Taylor writes this in his opening remarks “A number of strands in contemporary politics turn on the need, sometimes the demand, for recognition” [2]  Taylor sees these strands as being comprised by minority groups or what he calls “subaltern” groups, some forms of feminism, and multiculturalism. [3]

He goes on to succinctly communicate the thesis by acknowledging that recognition is inexorably linked with our identity. Understood in this way, it seems that Taylor is asserting that recognition has both ontological and ontic significance. He writes “The thesis is that our identity is partly shaped by recognition or its absence, often by the mis recognition of others, and so a person or group of people can suffer real damage, real distortion, if the people or society around them mirror back to them a confining or demeaning or contemptible picture of themselves. Nonrecognition or misrecognition can inflict harm, can be a form of oppression, imprisoning someone in a false, distorted, and reduced mode of being.” [4]

Habermas and Dialectical tension

Habermas takes umbrage with Taylor’s dualistic conception of liberalism. The dialectical tension between individual rights and freedoms on the one hand and the collective cultural identity of the majority on the other lead to a tension between the two. Case in point, says Habermas is the francophone project of French speaking Canadians in Quebec. Using this and feminism as a touch point for recognition and the implicit ethical presuppositions of legal and cultural norms, we are left with an analogous situation with respect to other minority groups. Habermas asserts that creating a new national boundary merely trades one minority for another.[5]  The majority culture [English speaking] exchanges places with the minority culture [French speaking]. However, this does not necessarily address the difficulty of multiculturalism. Habermas takes up the mantle of deconstructing “fundamentalist” traditions that militate against the inclusion of other ethical presuppositions as related to the good. Habermas writes “”coexistence with equal rights for these forms of life requires the mutual recognition of the different cultural memberships: all persons must also be recognized as members of ethical communities integrated around different conceptions of the good” [6] In order for this hypothetical imperative to flourish, fundamentalist traditions must concede that various conceptions of the good must be considered equally valid and seemingly cannot transcend mere pragmatic conceptions of the good per se.

Objections to Taylor and Habermas

According to Taylor, nonrecognition “can” cause a parade of horribles such as oppression and a reduced mode of being. The operative word of course is “can” but this proposition is weak and cannot be demonstrably proven to follow by necessity.  Equally plausible is the notion that recognition “can” also cause diminished modes of being. Such could be the case when the majority culture and the minority culture reverse their status. A simple thought experiment can prove that nonrecognition cannot be thought of univocally. If in a culture the collective identity of (A) entails a conception of the good that disallows as unethical one of the main thrusts of (B)’s collective identity it simply cannot coexist in a merely correlative form, rather the entire conception of the good is called into question. In such a case the dialectical tension implicit in competing worldviews [i.e. collective identities] is only resolved through synthesis, which seems to be a diminished mode of being by way of recognition and not merely nonrecognition as Taylor asserts. The objection might be raised that in the quote from Taylor he mentions “recognition” as a potential source but contextualizing recognition as a source of oppression fails to obtain since he conjoins [non-and-mis] recognition with harm, oppression, imprisonment, and reduced modes of being.

Habermas on the other hand, wants us to accept the premise that conceptions of the good are conditioned by abstraction from the ethical community with which one identifies. The subjectivist nature of such a proposal entails nonrecognition of ethical communities that cannot accept an arbitrary conception of the good based merely on the implicit pragmatism entailed by competing ethical principles. Asserting a Utopian conception of multiculturalism based on co-equally ultimate conceptions of the good is a far cry from demonstrating how competing conceptions of the good can be resolved without embracing a synthesizing of the good for the greater good of multiculturalism.  A point that seems to be missed is that some collective identities are deontological rather than subjectivist. Is coexistence and recognition even possible univocally between a collective identity that embraces ethical subjectivism and one that embraces a deontological morality that transcends merely human conceptions of the good?

Subaltern Groups demand recognition 

Multiculturalism presupposes that certain groups will demand recognition. Certainly with issues of transgender we see this demand being played out in the public square. The dialectical tension between the ethical community that is based on traditional or in Habermas’ words a fundamentalist ethos must either grant recognition or deny recognition.

This tension cannot find resolution as it posits an untenable dichotomy. Once the majority ethical community gives way, they have now become oppressed in the sense that the good in such a community is compromised. If such an ethical community refuses to concede, the subaltern groups’ claims of oppression continue ad infinitum. The neoliberal solution to this dichotomy finds the synthesis in third party power structures i.e. government enforcement of measures that coerce recognition.

The majority will never have the same voice as a subaltern group in expressing a demand for recognition given that the ethical abstractions are based on the majority view. In other words, until a majority becomes a subaltern group by way of inversion (that is to say until the normative morality of the majority becomes the subaltern group) the demands of the subaltern group will hold more sway. Multiculturalism is cyclical in that there is a repetition of oppression and concession followed by oppression. No society can hold multiple conceptions of the good without a synthesizing of competing ethical communities.

[1] His association with the Frankfurt school is infamous. While some might say this association is spurious, a fair representation might be that his works are derivative or at least owe some level of homage to the Frankfurt School

[2] Charles Taylor, K. A. (1994 ). Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition . Princeton : Princeton University Press.

[3] Ibid

[4] Ibid

[5] Pg. 127

[6] Pg. 133